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Rex Brynen is Professor of Political Science and Chair of the 
Middle East Studies Program at McGill University. He has written 
extensively on the politics of Palestine and Jordan, the Arab-
Israeli conflict, and authoritarianism and democratization in the 
Arab world. Forthcoming publications include The Palestinians: 
Finding No Freedom in Liberation and The Iraq War: Causes and 
Consequences (Boulder: Lynne Rienner) and Palestinian 
Refugees: Challenges of Repatriation and Development (London: 
I. B. Taurus).  
One of the central goals of current U.S. foreign policy is to 
establish democracy in the Middle East. To do this, a central 
prerequisite is holding democratic elections in Middle Eastern 
countries. In one case, however, such elections have led to an 
outcome that shocked many in the West – the victory of Hamas 
in Palestine. How did an Islamist organization that the United 
States has branded as “terrorist” manage to win, and what are 
the implications of this development for the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and the greater Middle East region?  
Rex Brynen, chair of the Middle East Studies Program at McGill 
University, argues that Hamas won an overwhelming victory in 
Palestine not because it ran on an Islamist platform, and perhaps 
contrary to conventional wisdom, not because it was explicitly 
against the peace process with Israel. Rather, Hamas won in 
Palestine for two main reasons. First, it conducted an excellent 
electoral campaign with good organization, solid candidates, and 
clear message to the electorate. Second, it promised good and 
clean governance. Hence, Hamas' strength was its platform 
against corruption and for social welfare.  
Relations with Israel, Brynen says, were not high on the priority 
list of Palestinian voters. Most were highly dissatisfied with the 
incompetence of Fatah, the secular nationalist organization that 
had long ruled Palestine. Fatah had come to be perceived as very 
corrupt, relying on patronage and failing to deliver to the people. 
Hamas, on the other hand, ran on the message that it possessed 
an ethics of clean governance, was resolved to fight corruption, 
and understood the importance of social welfare for ordinary 
Palestinians.  
The scale of Hamas' victory in the Palestinian parliament 
surprised not only Western observers but Hamas itself. With its 
militantly anti-Israeli rhetoric, Hamas expected to do well enough 
in elections to put Fatah in a difficult position with regard to the 
peace process. But because Fatah ran an incompetent campaign, 
Hamas emerged with an absolute majority and suddenly had to 
assume governance. This meant not just running the Palestinian 
territories, but also figuring out how to deal with Israel.  
Although Hamas won by a landslide, Brynen argues, this does not 
mean that Palestinian voters support an Islamist political and 
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social program. In fact, support for Hamas vacillates widely over 
time, and it does so inversely with the health of negotiations with 
Israel. At the height of the peace process, Hamas had the 
approval of just 9 percent of the electorate, in other words, only 
its core ideological support group. Most Palestinians, however, 
are floating voters whose opinions tend to change. As 
negotiations with Israel have ground to a halt, support for pro-
peace process parties has declined precipitously not only in 
Palestine, but also Israel as well.  
Events in the region since 2000 seem to have convinced people 
on both sides is that resorting to force is the most effective way 
to deal with one another. The second Palestinian intifada and the 
unilateral actions by Israel in setting the final borders have 
strengthened more extremist forces. The election of Hamas 
government seems to have made chances for a peaceful 
resolution even slimmer. Instead of negotiations, a vicious cycle 
of Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli construction of the 
separation wall and restrictions on Palestinian mobility in the 
West Bank has set in.  
In reaction to Israeli occupation, Hamas' message is more 
militant than Fatah's, and its avowed goal amounts to nothing 
less than destruction of Israel. However, it is noteworthy that the 
majority of Palestinians and even the majority of Hamas 
supporters are in favor of a two-state solution. In fact, its radical 
rhetoric notwithstanding, Hamas has mainly kept the ceasefire 
with Israel since it assumed the government. But its refusal to 
recognize Israel presents the Western policymakers with a basic 
dilemma in relations with the new Palestinian leadership: namely, 
how to deal with a legitimate democratic government that 
refuses to be part of the peace process.  
Brynen argues that the West could take one of two possible 
approaches to the Hamas government: isolation or engagement. 
Americans and Europeans seem to have settled for different 
options. The United States refuses to deal with the Hamas 
government until Hamas explicitly recognizes the right of Israel 
to exist. Because Hamas refuses to do so, the United States has 
cut financial support to Palestine and opted to exert financial and 
political pressure to bring down the current Palestinian 
government. Europeans, on the other hand, are in favor 
engaging Hamas and talking with the democratically elected 
government in order to induce it to modify and moderate its 
position on Israel.  
Brynen thinks that either approach could work in convincing 
Hamas to moderate its views and participate in efforts to find a 
peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But neither is likely 
to work if they are applied only half way. Perhaps more 
important, attempting to bring down the Hamas government 
cannot be done overtly. The United States might secretly inform 
the Palestinian government that it will cut all ties and support if 
Hamas continues to adhere to its radical position. But Americans 
should never explicitly announce that Hamas ought to be brought 
down, not least because this would hurt the greater goal of 
democratizing the Arab world. The United States cannot claim to 
support democratization and then openly undermine a 
democratically elected government. 
Whatever path is chosen, Brynen said, a solution to the current 
fiscal crisis of Palestinian territories must be found soon. The 
economic situation in Palestine is getting worse by the day, and 
according to the World Bank, unemployment, poverty, and 
malnourishment is increasing to critical levels as Israel blocks 
Palestinian trade and transfer of goods and withholds its tax 
money. If the West continues to refuse to provide aid to 
Palestine, the crisis will be disastrous in the Palestinian 
territories, and the ensuing breakdown of law and order will 
affect Israel adversely as well.  
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